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739 
DETERMINING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF 
IPv4 ADDRESSES  
INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the Internet ushered in an era of unprecedented legal 
challenges as jurists and legislators struggled to keep up with rapidly 
evolving technology.
1
 Chief among these issues is whether certain types of 
intangible data, specifically Internet Protocol addresses
2
 (IP addresses), 
can be owned and treated as intangible property. The world has nearly 
exhausted its supply of unique IPv4 addresses and the property rights of 
individuals utilizing IPv4 addresses are poorly defined. This area of law 
has not been subject to robust examination by the US court system. A few 
recent bankruptcy cases have tangentially reached the issue of whether IP 
addresses may be owned by private corporations instead of the Regional 
Internet Registries (RIRs) that administer and maintain the vast amounts 
of IP numbers.
3
 The apparent tension is between those RIRs that wish to 
maintain their exclusive property rights in all IP addresses, and large 
companies, universities, and other institutions that were assigned IP 
addresses with very few, if any, contractual limitations and wish to 
exercise their own property rights in these IP addresses. This Note will 
seek to explore the modern issues associated with IP address ownership, 
evaluate the relative merit of all stakeholders’ property claims vis-à-vis IP 
addresses, and recommend possible solutions from other areas of property 
law, while keeping one eye on future developments and market continuity.  
This Note will begin by recounting a concise history of the 
development of IP addresses, taking time to specifically flag changes in 
concepts of address ownership and providing basic information on 
subjects such as RIRs, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN). Part I will outline the differences between legacy and 
non-legacy IP addresses, while noting how those differences potentially 
affect the property rights bound up in the respective categories. Part I will 
also explore how different stakeholders view property rights in IP 
 
 
 1. See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607 
n.1 (2009) (defining the Internet Age as “the period from 1994 to the present”). 
 2. See Ryan et al., Legal and Policy Aspects of Internet Number Resources, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335, 370 (2008) (An IP address is “a number that identifies the location 
of a computer on a network. IP addresses are used to identify the origin of a packet of transmitted data, 
the destination of that packet of data, as well as any intermediate points that may exist along the path 
between the origin and the destination.”). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
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addresses. IPv4 address administration is currently organized as a multi-
stakeholder model, and as such, this Note is organized by the views of 
each major stakeholder in IPv4 technology: the American Registry for 
Internet Numbers’ (ARIN) view, the US Government’s view, and the free 
market view. Part II will discuss the major cases that have shaped the 
current state of property rights in IP addresses and similar devices such as 
domain names. Part III will compare the views of the major stakeholders 
in IP addresses. Part IV will survey the major theories of property law that 
underlie the current views on IP address property rights. It will explore 
how different social values—such as transparency, openness, and 
fairness—impact whether property rights ought to be recognized in IPv4 
addresses. Finally, part V will identify and evaluate potential solutions to 
this complex legal issue. The most likely of the solutions is a judicial 
recognition of the existing extra-judicial status quo struck between ARIN 
and IPv4 address traders. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF IP ADDRESSES 
As with any property issue, a precise definition of the issue is 
paramount. IP addresses at their basic level are a system of standardized 
communication protocols that allow computers to send and receive data 
and route that information to its proper destination.
4
 The current version of 
IP addresses was developed after three prior versions failed in 1981.
5
 
These addresses were known as IPv4 addresses. IPv4 addresses are binary 
numbers that are typically represented in dotted decimal notation (i.e. 
123.45.789.101).
6
 Because of this construction there is a finite number of 
unique IPv4 addresses, a little over four billion, that can be assigned at a 
given time.
7
 It is important to note at this juncture that IP addresses do not 
refer to Domain Name Registrations, which are distinct from IP addresses, 
but will provide a useful basis for comparison later in this Note. 
 
 
 4. See INFO. SCI. INST., Internet Eng’g Task Force, DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL 
SPECIFICATION 1 (Sept. 1981), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt. 
 5. See Jonathan B. Postel, Comments on Internet Protocol and TCP, INTERNET EXPERIMENT 
NOTES No. 2 (Aug. 15, 1977), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/ien/ien2.txt; Vinton Cerf, A Proposed 
New Internet Header Format, INTERNET EXPERIMENT NOTES No. 26 (Feb. 14, 1978), http://www.rfc-
editor.org/ien/ien26.pdf; Jonathan B. Postel, Draft Internetwork Protocol Specification Version 2, 
INTERNET EXPERIMENT NOTES No. 28 (Feb. 1978), https://www.rfc-editor.org/ien/ien28.pdf. 
 6. See IPv4 Addressing, JUNIPER NETWORKS, http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/software/junos-
es/junos-es93/junos-es-swconfig-interfaces-and-routing/ipv4-addressing.html (last visited Nov. 17, 
2015) (noting that a host may be a network or device that is used to connect to the Internet and that an 
IP address may vary depending on the scope of the network or type of device). 
 7. IPv4 Address Report, POTAROO.NET, http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2015). 
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These addresses have served as the primary vehicle for the expansion 
of the Internet.
8
 For the past two decades, many scholars and network 
administrators have warned that the world is rapidly approaching the 
exhaustion of IPv4 addresses, and as such, an alternative needs to be 
developed.
9
 A group of researchers at the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) came up with IPv6 addresses as a solution to the growing scarcity 
of IPv4 addresses.
10
 While these addresses will provide the addressing 
destinations necessary to facilitate further expansion of the Internet, the 
transition to IPv6 has been slow and uneven.
11
 The developing world has 
been much slower to adopt the technological requirements necessary for 
the IPv6 transition, meaning that IPv4 addresses are still the primary type 
of Internet routing numbers.
12
 
A. Two Types of IPv4 Addresses: Legacy and Non-Legacy 
Long before IPv6 Addresses take the place of IPv4 Addresses, the 
Internet community will face very real and costly challenges regarding the 
fate of the IPv4 addresses that were assigned to companies, schools, 
private individuals, and governments. IPv4 Addresses are treated as two 
distinct categories of numbers based upon how they were originally 
distributed: legacy IP addresses and non-legacy IP addresses.  
Prior to the formation of the RIRs, legacy IPv4 addresses were 
assigned by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA); in the early 
days of the Internet, these were assigned informally by a single person: 
John Postel.
13
 For the most part, “these numbers were assigned without 
contract or use limitations” because they were assigned prior to the 
formalization of Internet architecture.
14
 In many cases, the U.S. 
government merely processed early applications for government 
contractors and assigned addresses as requested.
15
 IANA directly 
distributed these early addresses to all sorts of organizations.
 
Unlike non-
 
 
 8. Ernesto M. Rubi, The IPV4 Number Crisis: The Question of Property Rights in Legacy and 
Non-Legacy IPV4 Numbers, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 477, 479 (2011). 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
 10. STEPHEN E. DEERING & ROBERT M. HINDEN, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, 
INTERNET PROTOCOL, VERSION 6 (IPV6) SPECIFICATION 3 (Dec. 1995), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/ 
rfc1883.txt. 
 11. See IPv6 Statistics, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html#tab=per-
country-ipv6-adoption&tab=per-country-ipv6-adoption. (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
 12. Id. 
 13. VINTON G. CERF, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, RFC 2468: I REMEMBER IANA 1 (Oct. 17, 
1998), https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2468.txt (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). 
 14. See Rubi, supra note 8, at 486–87.  
 15. See Ryan et. al., supra note 2, at 370. 
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legacy addresses, legacy address-holders did not enter into any binding 
legal agreement delineating the address-holder’s rights in those 
addresses.
16
 This is the defining characteristic of legacy addresses. Legacy 
addresses constitute approximately 45% of all IPv4 addresses in use.
17
 The 
sheer number of legacy addresses and the fact that the majority of them 
were assigned in the very early stages of the development of the modern 
Internet means that significant portions of legacy addresses (organized in 
large groups called blocks) sit unused and are easily exploited by hackers, 
spammers, and illegal pornographers.
18
 There are strong public policy 
implications
19
 weighing in favor of developing and maintaining a more 
secure framework for administering and tracking legacy addresses.  
Non-legacy IPv4 addresses, as the name suggests, were assigned after 
the formation of RIRs, and are thus subject to contractual limitations on 
their transferability and usage.
20
 Non-legacy IP addresses present 
fundamentally different legal challenges compared to their legacy 
counterparts.
21
 As a result of this framework and the relative youth of the 
Internet, RIRs had a substantial role in establishing early-Internet 
governance norms surrounding IPv4 addresses.
22
 What has emerged is a 
restrictive environment surrounding the third-party transferability, 
assignment, and usage of both legacy and non-legacy IPv4 addresses.
23
  
 
 
 16. Legacy address holders have not agreed to any limitations on their ability to use, transfer, or 
otherwise maintain their addresses. See Rubi, supra note 8, at 486 (quoting MILTON MUELLER ET AL., 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT, DIMENSIONING THE ELEPHANT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
IPV4 NUMBER MARKET 1 (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/IPv4marketTPRC20121.pdf). 
 17. See MILTON MUELLER & BRENDEN KUERBIS, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT, REGIONAL 
ADDRESS REGISTRIES, GOVERNANCE AND INTERNET FREEDOM 1, 5 (Nov. 26, 2008), 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/RIRs-IGP-hyderabad. 
 18. Id. at 9. 
 19. With improved tracking and registration services for IP addresses, RIRs would better be able 
to monitor and report potential dark addresses to law enforcement officials, and RIRs would be better 
able to understand IP address usage to help improve IP address reclamation procedures. 
 20. Rubi, supra note 8, at 487. In North America, these contracts take the form of ARIN’s 
Registration Services Agreements. Among other things, these agreements set forth the rights (or lack 
thereof) in IP addresses and detail the services ARIN provides. See Registration Services Agreement, 
AMERICAN REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, LTD. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.arin.net/resources/ 
agreements/rsa.pdf. 
 21. See supra note 17, at 11.  
 22. Id. 
 23. ARIN at a Glance, ARIN, https://www.arin.net/about_us/overview.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016) (ARIN provides an array of services to both its membership and non-members including 
WHOIS lookup services for IP addresses, free registration services, and monitors IP address traffic.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/9
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B. Regional Internet Registries  
To some RIRs are restricting the flow of commerce on the Internet and 
generally causing problems for the free market. The reality, as is often the 
case, is much more complex. RIRs, such as ARIN which services North 
America’s IP addresses, play an important role in the policing and 
maintenance of billions of addresses.
24
 This Note will focus on ARIN due 
to its immediate applicability to the US legal system and the representative 
nature of ARIN’s policies compared to most RIRs.25  
ARIN is a nonprofit, trade/membership organization based in 
Washington, D.C. that “provides services related to the technical 
coordination and management of Internet number resources.”26 ARIN is 
governed by an executive board which is elected by ARIN’s membership. 
The services that ARIN provides fall into one of four categories: 
registration, organization, policy development, and technical services.
27
 
ARIN routinely holds public meetings for the purposes of engaging in 
policy discussions and educating about new ARIN services, among other 
things. Membership is not required to use ARIN’s Internet number 
resources.
28
  
ARIN (along with the other RIRs) maintains that it alone is able to 
exercise assignment and control rights in IPv4 addresses (and IPv6 for that 
matter).
29
 This puts ARIN directly at odds with legacy address holders 
who possess large blocks of unused IP addresses.
30
 At best, these legacy 
addresses represent potentially valuable resources, and at worst, potential 
liabilities that are costly to maintain.
31
 Interestingly, ARIN has 
demonstrated a willingness “to modify its contractual arrangements to 
 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See generally supra note 16 (noting how ARIN adopted an IPv4 address transfer policy a few 
years after other RIRs). 
 26. See ARIN at a Glance, supra note 23. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey (J.D., University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 
Law School; M.S. University of Pennsylvania) & Janine Goodman (J.D. University of Chicago Law 
School), President and Vice-President, Avenue4, LLC (Jan. 12, 2016) (full recording on file with 
author). Lindsey and Goodman began one of the first firms to advise clients on IP transfers. This 
interview focused on the nature of the private market for IPv4 addresses and the mechanics of IPv4 
transactions. ARIN’s role in policing transactions was discussed at length. Somewhat surprisingly, Mr. 
Lindsey noted that the private market has existed long enough to develop its own commercial norms, 
which can be loosely called standardized practices within IPv4 transfers. Additionally, Ms. Goodman 
noted how their approach to IPv4 advising is just one of many employed by attorneys engaged in IPv4 
transactions, and that several approaches can produce results. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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strengthen recipients’ property rights in order to keep market participants 
from abandoning its contractual governance regime.”32 ARIN’s position is 
essentially that it is the only organization sufficiently equipped with the 
expertise and resources to administer IP addresses to the Internet 
community.
33
 ARIN’s position is at odds with the views of some IP 
address stakeholders.
34
 ARIN has found itself in the middle of various 
legal disputes recently, arguing against companies who claim to have 
property rights in legacy IPv4 addresses.
35
 
C. IPv4 Scarcity 
Private legacy address holders wish to exercise ownership and control 
of IP addresses assigned decades ago, while ARIN wishes to retain 
exclusive ownership and control over these addresses. Recall that at the 
outset of IPv4 adoption, there were over four billion unique addresses. For 
some time, scholars have been warning that we are rapidly approaching 
the end of our unique IPv4 address allocation in North America.
36
 Some 
RIRs have exhausted their allocations already.
37
 Indeed, ARIN exhausted 
its allocation of IPv4 addresses in July of this year.
38
 Listening to these 
sources, the situation seems quite dire. 
It turns out that the sky is not falling after all—at least not yet. A keen 
observer of Internet governance issues will note that the calls to recognize 
the impending “crisis” have been around for over a decade, and the precise 
date of exhaustion is a constantly moving target.
39
 So exactly how serious 
is the situation? Perhaps the best way to describe it would be a “delayed 
 
 
 32. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 11. 
 33. MILTON MUELLER, ARIN Stumbles Into The Nortel-Microsoft IP Address Deal, INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2011/04/15/arin-
stumbles-into-the-nortel-microsoft-ip-address-deal (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
 34. See supra note 8 passim. 
 35. See infra Part II.B.  
 36. See Robert McMillan, Coming This Summer: U.S. Will Run Out of Internet Addresses, WALL 
ST. J. (May 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/coming-this-summer-u-s-will-run-out-of-internet-
addresses-1431479401; James Sanders, ARIN warns of IPv4 exhaustion in one week, TECHREPUBLIC 
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/arin-warns-of-ipv4-exhaustion-in-one-week. 
 37. See IPv4 Address Report, supra note 7. To compare the relative levels of IPv4 addresses that 
have not yet been assigned refer to “Figure 4 - Address Pools by RIR by State.” 
 38. Iljitsch van Beijnum, It’s Official: North America Out of New IPv4 Addresses, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 2, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/07/us-exhausts-new-
ipv4-addresses-waitlist-begins. 
 39. Lee Schlesinger, Whatever happened to the IPv4 address crisis?, NETWORKWORLD (Feb. 17, 
2014), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2174297/lan-wan/whatever-happened-to-the-ipv4-address-
crisis-.html (discussing the creative engineering moves by ARIN and other RIRs to delay IPv4 
exhaustion). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/9
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crisis.” ARIN and the other RIRs have developed ingenious ways to 
stretch the existing supply of IPv4 numbers.
40
 The result has been a 
decelerated march towards the end of IPv4 address availability.
41
 ARIN, 
while it technically has several thousand in reserve, has all but exhausted 
its supply of addresses.
42
 However, ARIN’s remaining supply of IPv4 
addresses is a tiny fraction of its original allocation.
43
 In a perfect world, 
IPv6 adoption would have taken place years prior to IPv4 exhaustion; 
however, it is the responsibility of individual companies and institutions to 
make this transition, and some entities have been more proactive than 
others.
44
 To put the current rate of IPv6 adoption in perspective: from 
April 5, 2016 to August 23, 2016 the percentage of the top 1,000 websites 
that are currently reachable over IPv6 increased from 17.9% to 19%.
45
 
These facts underscore the acute need for changes to existing IPv4 
policies, and the need for the expedited adoption of IPv6 addresses in 
order to ensure seamless expansion of the Internet.  
D. The Market Response 
In response to the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses, private markets have 
popped up to facilitate the purchase, sale, and transfer of IPv4 addresses. 
Beginning around 2008, various RIRs began recognizing the inevitable 
reality that IPv4 exhaustion would occur long before IPv6 adoption.
46
 
Thus, most RIRs adopted market transfer policies allowing mostly legacy 
addresses to be sold in private markets.
47
 The caveat is that these sales still 
have to be registered with the appropriate RIR, and the party purchasing 
IPv4 Addresses must “demonstrate need” under ARIN’s Section 8.3 
transfer policy.
48
 Further, ARIN requires all new purchasers of IPv4 
 
 
 40. Id. ARIN has undertaken significant efforts to extend the life of the current IPv4 address 
pool. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See van Beijnum, supra note 38. Interestingly, the precise number of remaining unallocated 
IPv4 addresses is subject to some dispute. While it is understood that ARIN has some IPv4 addresses 
held in reserve, most RIRs have already exhausted their allocation of IPv4 addresses. This creates 
regional supply shortages which complicates the transition to IPv6. See id. 
 43. See MUELLER, ARIN, supra note 33; see also Measurements, WORLD IPV6 LAUNCH, 
http://www.worldipv6launch.org/measurements (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (tracking the adoption of 
IPv6 addresses overall and on a company-by-company basis). 
 44. See Measurements, supra note 43.  
 45. Id. 
 46. About World IPv6 Day, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.internetsociety.org/ipv6/archive-2011-
world-ipv6-day (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
 47. See MUELLER et. al., Dimensioning the Elephant, supra note 16, at 11; see also infra note 48. 
 48. Transfer Resources, AMERICAN REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, LTD, https://www.arin. 
net/resources/transfers (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).  
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addresses to agree to abide by ARIN’s terms and conditions, known as the 
Registration Services Agreement (RSA).
49
 Interestingly, these private 
markets developed several years before IPv4 exhaustion occurred in North 
America.
50
 North America has one of the most robust private IPv4 markets 
in the world.
51
 Marc Lindsey and Janine Goodman, two prominent IPv4 
attorneys in Washington, D.C., have carved out a niche legal practice 
advising clients and facilitating the transfer of IPv4 addresses between 
private parties.
52
  
Legacy addresses constitute the overwhelming majority of private IP 
address transfers.
53
 About 6.03 million IP addresses have been transferred 
in private markets.
54
 89% (5.36 million) of those transfers involved 
addresses that are classified as legacy allocations by IANA or their 
respective RIR.
55
 This is indicative of two things: (1) ARIN’s amended 
RSA still disfavors private transfers of non-legacy IPv4 addresses, and 
(2) companies and institutions are willing to pay a premium for legacy 
addresses even though some purchasers could have applied for free non-
legacy addresses through ARIN.  
II. THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF LEGACY IPV4 ADDRESSES 
While the private market responded with speed and vigor to the 
changing landscape of IPv4 address ownership, the legal status of these 
property interests has yet to be decisively determined. Even with ARIN’s 
relaxed standards regarding the transfer and sale of legacy addresses, the 
question remains whether ARIN’s imposition of mild restrictions over 
legacy transfers is lawful. Before attempting to answer that question, it is 
necessary to review the pertinent case law. The following cases represent 
the most recent and relevant cases on the issue of whether property rights 
exist in certain Internet resources; while they seem disparate and 
disconnected, they are the only U.S. case law on the subject.
56
  
 
 
 49. See Registration Services Agreement, supra note 20. 
 50. Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“[Practicioners 
viewed IPv4 [addresses] as an asset long before [the] Microsoft [transaction]”). 
 51. Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, An Insider’s guide to the private IPv4 market, 
NETWORKWORLD (May 27, 2015), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2927216/lan-wan/an-
insider-s-guide-to-the-private-ipv4-market.html. 
 52. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. 
 53. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 8. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See Rubi, supra note 8 passim. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/9
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A. Kremen v. Cohen 
Kremen
57
 was the first case of its kind in the United States that 
delineated property rights in Internet numbers. However, this case did not 
specifically deal with IPv4 addresses; instead it dealt with domain 
names.
58
 The court in Kremen held that, in the absence of an express 
contract, a registrar of domain names could not preclude a registrant from 
assigning a domain name to another party.
59
 Due to the similarities 
between domain names and IP addresses, this case opened the door for the 
more recent battle over ownership rights in IPv4 addresses. The district 
court in Kremen did touch on IPv4 address ownership, albeit indirectly, by 
saying that ARIN can allocate non-legacy numbers and subject the 
registrant to ARIN’s RSA.60 However, this did not have any bearing on the 
state of legacy IPv4 addresses.
61
 The implication of the discussion of IPv4 
addresses in the district court seems to be that ARIN may only place 
restrictions on the usage of IPv4 addresses if the end user has agreed to 
ARIN’s RSA.62 In turn, this suggests that ARIN cannot exercise control 
over legacy addresses.
63
 Other courts have similarly implied that legacy-
address holders in fact “own” those numbers.64 These decisions are not 
binding, and thus more clarification is needed. 
B. In Re Nortel Networks
65
 
Nortel
66
 involved a successful attempt by Nortel Networks 
Incorporated (NNI) to sell several blocks of IPv4 numbers to Microsoft 
 
 
 57. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 58. Id. at 1029. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Rubi, supra note 8, at 490 (Rubi points out that this is dicta from the district court, legacy 
addresses were not discussed in the 9th Circuit opinion). 
 61. See Declaration of Raymond A. Plzak in Support of Motion to Clarify/Modify at 5, Kremen 
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that as to “‘legacy’ [addresses] issued . . . before 
ARIN began, ARIN has never had an agreement . . . that would give it authority over those specific 
resources”). 
 62. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (assertion generally follows from Kremen’s discussion of 
contract limitations in domain name space). 
 63. This assertion is based on an expansive reading of Kremen and is not recognized by any U.S. 
court.  
 64. Chism v. Washington, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (E.D. Wash. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Chism 
v. Washington State, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn from bound volume and rev'd and 
remanded, 661 F.3d 380 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The IP address (68.113.11.49) was owned by Charter 
Communications.”). 
 65. In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09BK10138, 2011 WL 1560720 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 21, 
2011). 
 66. For a thorough description of In re Nortel Networks and its impact, see Rubi at 501–505. 
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Corporation (Microsoft) as part of its bankruptcy estate.
67
 Nortel attempted 
to sell these IPv4 assets by retaining a broker to help identify potential 
purchasers, Microsoft submitted the highest bid.
68
 This case attracted the 
attention of many interested third parties, including the Canadian 
government and ARIN.
69
 Ultimately, the court approved the sale, in large 
part because Nortel’s IP addresses were legacy addresses, and because 
ARIN intervened and negotiated a Legacy Registration Services 
Agreement (LRSA) with Microsoft prior to the entry of the order 
approving the sale.
70
 Nortel is especially important considering it opened 
the floodgates to large corporate transfers of legacy IPv4 addresses.
71
 This 
paradigm of Internet number property rights is echoed in subsequent large 
company bankruptcy proceedings.
72
 
The key question Nortel presents is whether ARIN’s intervention in the 
bankruptcy proceedings were necessary for the court’s eventual approval 
of the sale of IPv4 numbers.
73
 In one of the earliest comments on the 
subject, Ernesto Rubi argues that ARIN’s involvement in the transaction 
and the subsequent Microsoft-ARIN LRSA were merely incidental to the 
court’s approval of the sale.74 However, three facts weigh heavily against 
such a reading. First, NNI submitted an additional brief in support of the 
proposed sale in order to inform the court that Microsoft had agreed to 
enter into an LRSA with ARIN prior to the approval of the sale, and to 
state that “neither ARIN nor the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
 
 
 67. See generally In re Nortel Networks Inc. 
 68. See Rubi at 502. 
 69. See Brief in Support of Motion to Approve Sale of Internet Numbers, In re Nortel Networks 
Inc. (Bankr. D. Del.) (No. 09-10138), 2011 WL 7403924 (Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy 
Sector of the Department of Industry, a department of the Government of Canada’s brief in support); 
see Order (I) Authorizing and Approving the Sale of Internet Numbers Free and Clear of All Liens, 
Claims, Encumbrances and Interests; (II) Authorizing and Approving Entry Into A Purchase and Sale 
Agreement; (III) Authorizing the Filing of Certain Documents Under Seal; and (IV) Granting Related 
Relief, In re Nortel Networks Corp. at 4, 426 B.R. 84 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (No. 09-10138) 
(hereinafter “Order Authorizing and Approving Sale”). 
 70. Order Authorizing and Approving the Sale, at 8 (“For the avoidance of doubt, the Order shall 
not affect the LRSA and the purchaser’s rights in the Internet Numbers transferred pursuant to this 
Order shall be subject to the terms of the LRSA.”). 
 71. Cf. ARIN at a Glance, supra note 23. Goodman and Lindsey contend that Nortel was merely 
recognition of existing beliefs within Internet technology firms. While they agree that Nortel is the 
first instance of any U.S. court recognizing a private right to transfer IPv4 addresses, they assert that 
private market transfers of IPv4 addresses took place before Nortel was decided. See Telephone 
Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 31. 
 72. See infra Part II.C. 
 73. See Rubi at 504–05. 
 74. Id. 
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Names and Numbers oppose[d] the transaction….”75 Second, the 
Amended Purchase and Sale Agreement includes explicit language 
in the definition of the term “Sale Order” stating that “ARIN and 
Purchaser have entered into the LRSA and that no other Consents 
are required”, which suggests the parties viewed ARIN’s LRSA as a 
consent necessary to the transaction.
76
 And third, the final order 
approving the sale contains explicit language that the Order shall be 
subject to the terms of the LRSA.
77
 These facts demonstrate an 
intent by both NNI and Microsoft to comply with ARIN’s LRSA 
and thus to acknowledge the centrality of ARIN to the ongoing 
administration of IPv4 Numbers.
78
 
C. In Re Borders and In Re Teknowledge 
Two additional bankruptcy cases have helped solidify the contention 
that legacy IPv4 addresses are transferable between private parties. Both 
In Re Borders
79
 and In Re Teknowledge
80
 involved courts approving the 
sale of legacy IPv4 addresses as part of larger bankruptcy proceedings. 
These cases represent an important shift because not only are they 
geographically diverse, but they also involve diverse types of businesses.
81
 
This suggests that there is no technical knowledge barrier to the proper 
sale and transfer of IPv4 assets.
82
 Additionally, some of these cases help 
determine the value of legacy addresses at somewhere between $9.00 and 
 
 
 75. Debtors’ Reply in Further Support of Their Motion for Authorization and Approval of the 
Sale of Internet Numbers Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests, In re 
Nortel Networks Inc. (Bankr. D. Del.) (No. 09-10138), 2011 WL 7403924.  
 76. Amended and Restated Asset Sale Agreement by Nortel Networks Inc. and Microsoft 
Corporation, April 13, 2011 at 5, http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 
NNI-MSFT-ipsale.pdf. 
 77. See supra note 70. 
 78. Cf. Rubi at 504–05. 
 79. In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11–10614 MG, 2011 WL 5520261, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Bankr.S.D.NY_.-
2233_merged.pdf (authorized the bankruptcy trustee to sell IPv4 resources on behalf of the debtor). 
 80. In re Teknowledge Corp., No.10-60457, at *1 (not reported) (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012), 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Bankr.N.D.Cal_.-034022138232. 
pdf (authorized sale of IPv4 addresses for $590,000). 
 81. See, e.g., Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029; see also supra notes 79 and 80. 
 82. Essentially the fact that IP address ownership cases have come from companies of all types 
and sizes indicates that there is not a substantial amount of technical knowledge required to vindicate 
property rights in IP addresses. 
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$12.00 per address.
83
 The private market for these addresses places 
significant, yet highly variable, monetary value on these addresses.
84
 
Perhaps most impactful, however, was the private sale of legacy 
addresses from Merck Pharmaceutical to Amazon, Inc. in 2012.
85
 
Completed outside of bankruptcy proceedings, this transaction suggests 
increasing confidence in the private legacy IPv4 market.
86
 That two major 
companies were willing to pursue a deal of this size was a watershed 
moment for the private IPv4 market.
87
 Taken together, these independent 
sales underscore the value of legacy addresses in private markets, the 
willingness of legacy address holders to circumvent ARIN, and the limited 
acceptance of some courts as to the merit of the idea that legacy addresses 
contain de facto property rights.  
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNET NUMBERS 
Recent court rulings have moved the law of private ownership of 
legacy IPv4 addresses into relative uncertainty.
88
 To get a glimpse of the 
multi-layered interests at stake in this issue, there were dozens of third-
party briefs filed in the Microsoft-Nortel dispute both in support and in 
opposition.
89
 Those entities that have signed ARIN’s LRSA are 
contractually bound to follow ARIN policies, but what about those legacy 
address holders with no such contract? Viewed one way, ARIN is 
providing invaluable, free resources to all members of its geographic 
community that are inherently necessary to the continued operation and 
expansion of the Internet.
90
 The provision of these services may create an 
implied contract that may bind legacy holders without a formal contract to 
 
 
 83. See In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09BK10138, 2011 WL 1560720, at *1, *5–6 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Mar. 21, 2011) (purchase price of $7.5 million for 666,624 addresses); see also In re Borders 
Grp., 2011 WL 5520261, at *6; In re Teknowledge Corp., No.10-60457, at *2 (purchase price of 
$590,000 for 65,636 addresses). 
 84. MILTON MUELLER, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT, SCARCITY IN IP ADDRESSES: IPV4 
ADDRESS TRANSFER MARKETS AND THE REGIONAL INTERNET ADDRESS REGISTRIES 1, 8–9 (July 20, 
2008), http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/IPAddress_TransferMarkets. 
pdf. 
 85. Id. at 8. (“In 1992 [Merck] was given a /8 (16.78 million numbers). From that original 
allocation, it sold to Amazon two /12s (roughly 2.1 million numbers) early in 2012.”). In this context, 
“/8” refers to one eighth of a block of IP addresses. 
 86. See also Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“In 
terms of viewing IPv4 as an asset, Microsoft-Nortel was one manifestation of that.”). 
 87. Unfortunately, due to the private nature of the sale, the exact price of the IPv4 addresses is 
unknown to the public. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9. 
 88. See supra Part II.A–C. 
 89. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 90. See ARIN at a Glance, supra note 23.  
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follow ARIN’s policies.91 Viewed another way, legacy address holders are 
the owners of valuable property; while ARIN, a non-governmental body, 
is attempting to impose transfer and usage restrictions on these addresses 
without consent.
92
 Alternatively, IPv4 addresses could be viewed as 
containing sensitive personal information that must be protected in some 
fashion from surveillance or theft. These stakeholders hold separate views 
on the best way to administer IPv4 address space, and each view requires 
further scrutiny. 
A. Stakeholder One: ARIN 
ARIN’s position is relatively straightforward: ARIN provides a number 
of free services to those who use IPv4 addresses in its geographic service 
region, and all it asks in return is that users abide by the RSA.
93
 Since the 
private market for IPv4 addresses has sprung up, ARIN has been 
surprisingly responsive, despite the fact that the existence of any private 
transfer market decreases the influence ARIN is able to exert over the 
entire pool of IPv4 addresses.
94
 ARIN remains the largest stakeholder in 
any debate over ownership of IPv4 addresses, and as such will be 
necessarily involved in any major change to the legal footing of IPv4 
ownership.
95
 
From a practical perspective, ARIN and the other RIRs still are able to 
exercise considerable influence on the private market for IPv4 addresses.
96
 
While some of the notable IPv4 transfers took place without the 
acquiescence of an RIR, some RIRs have shown a willingness to amend 
their IPv4 transfer policies in light of the growing need to liberalize the 
market for IP addresses.
97
 The majority of RIRs around the world have 
 
 
 91. Cf. Rubi, supra note 8 at 494 (Some courts have called contracts such as ARIN’s LRSA and 
RSA “illusory contract[s]” because they can be modified or revoked without notice or consent.). 
 92. See id. at 502 (summarizing the order issued in Nortel which recognized property interests in 
legacy IP numbers). 
 93. ARIN at a Glance supra note 23. It should be noted that because this is ARIN’s corporate 
website, it is likely to cast information in a light favorable to ARIN and its policies. 
 94. See Understanding Legacy Registration Services Agreement (LRSA) Ver 3.0, 
https://www.arin.net/resources/legacy/understanding_lrsa3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (ARIN 
describes this document as “the first truly fundamental rewrite to the LRSA…” It was passed after 
considerable debate within ARIN’s membership regarding what to do about legacy addresses.). 
 95. ARIN is necessarily the largest stakeholder due to the sheer number of IPv4 addresses in 
ARIN’s registry that are subject to their RSA. This gives them an enormous amount of influence over 
topics beyond IP resource management, including broader topics of Internet governance. ARIN’s 
influence cannot be overstated. 
 96. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“For 
large buyers and sellers, registering transfers typically has more positives than negatives.”). 
 97. Id. 
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adopted less restrictive transfer policies.
98
 In the case of LACNIC and 
AFRINIC, the lack of transfer policy is not necessarily a bar to private 
market transfers.
99
 
Though it is an encouraging step that some RIRs demonstrated 
flexibility and a willingness to embrace a position they had once 
vehemently opposed, this further underscores the custom-based nature of 
the current IPv4 system.
100
 It is unclear whether this type of ad-hoc 
decision-making will be a net benefit to the operation of the current 
system of Internet governance.
101
  
In fairness, ARIN maintains robust public reporting and transparency 
procedures in connection with their administration of the pool of IPv4 
addresses.
102
 ARIN has advocated good faith positions that promote an 
equitable system of Internet number assignment.
103
 The fact that ARIN 
explicitly states that it will not inquire into the terms of private market 
transfers
104
 seems to support the image of ARIN as a responsible Internet 
watchman attempting to regulate aspects of the Internet without regard for 
its own bottom line. ARIN may be the only entity with the resources to do 
so effectively, which raises some eyebrows.  
B. Stakeholder Two: Government Agencies 
The precise view of various governments operating within the purview 
of ARIN is difficult to define. Governments often have competing 
interests in these areas that are borne out across complex relationships 
between regulators and politicians. However, there is some limited 
information regarding the position of the United States Department of 
Commerce
105
 and the position of the Canadian government under previous 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
106
 
 
 
 98. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3; see also New Policy Implemented (Transfers), 
ARIN, https://www.arin.net/vault/announcements/2009/20090601_nrpm.html (last visited Jan 19, 
2016). 
 99. For a detailed explanation of RIR transfer policy adoption, see MUELLER ET AL., supra note 
84, at 3. 
 100. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“ARIN was 
asking companies to voluntarily return [IPv4] addresses.”). 
 101. This statement necessarily requires a broad-based discussion of exactly what are the chief 
goals of Internet governance (e.g., security, open source development, equality of access).  
 102. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 6. 
 103. See generally Rubi, supra note 8. 
 104. See New Policy Implemented (Transfer), supra note 98. 
 105. Lawrence E. Strickling, United States Government’s Internet Protocol Numbering 
Principles, NTIA BLOG (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blogs. 
 106. See Brief in Support of Motion to Approve Sale of Internet Numbers, supra note 69, at 1. 
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The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) has consistently 
advocated for a multi-stakeholder approach in dealing with issues related 
to IP resources.
107
 More pertinently, the DOC strongly advocates for the 
supremacy of the RIRs, specifically ARIN’s continued importance to the 
overall structure of modern Internet governance.
108
  
In connection with the Nortel Networks bankruptcy with Microsoft, the 
Strategic Policy Sector of the Department of Industry of Canada filed a 
brief in opposition to the sale of Internet numbers by Nortel Networks.
109
 
In that motion, the Canadian government argued that legacy IPv4 
addresses were not protectable property, stating that “[i]t is our view that 
Internet Numbers never became the property of the persons who were 
authorised [sic] to use them, nor were they ever free of the conditions 
governing their use.”110 This is a fascinating position to come from a 
governmental source. It suggests that the Canadian government is content 
with a foreign corporation being the sole clearinghouse for Internet 
numbers.
111
 Ultimately the position of the Canadian government had little 
effect on the eventual sale of addresses to Microsoft, however their 
disclaiming of any property rights in IPv4 addresses hints at a possible 
solution. 
Taken together, these position statements illustrate the entrenched 
nature of RIRs to the administration of the Internet. The effect of these 
policies being in lockstep with one another is that any sort of institutional 
reform originating in the government will be very difficult to achieve 
without significant paradigm shifts from American and Canadian policy-
makers. 
If the erosion of ARIN’s capacity to effectively regulate and control 
Internet numbers is the greatest concern going forward,
112
 then it is easy to 
see why the Canadian government takes the position that no property 
rights can exist in IPv4 addresses. In their view, ensuring that ARIN can 
control as many aspects of the IP address pool as possible, ARIN is 
making the continued expansion of the Internet simultaneously more 
 
 
 107. See Strickling, supra note 105. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Brief in Support of Motion to Approve Sale of Internet Numbers, supra note 69, at 1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. For the U.S. government, this is less troubling because ARIN operates on an explicit grant of 
authority from the Dept. of Commerce. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 
31, 741–43 (June 10, 1998). 
 112. There is a value judgment implicit in this statement. If Internet security is less important than, 
say, transparency on the Internet, then there is a strong argument to be made that other issues are 
paramount. 
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secure and more equitable. The view is straightforward: The Internet has 
been a cooperative endeavor since the beginning, and the idea that the 
pathways upon which our Internet relies can be bought and sold is 
antithetical to a free, open, and equal Internet.  
Further, there are major implications for law enforcement. If 
unrestricted private sales are authorized, it could lead to an increase in the 
amount of unregistered IPv4 addresses.
113
 These unregistered IPv4 
addresses would not be able to be paired with their corresponding owner, 
which would hamper law enforcement officials attempting to shut down 
pornographers, scammers, identity thieves, etc.
114
 These unregistered IP 
addresses, or “black numbers,” would effectively “mask the activities and 
identities of the perpetrators of such activities.”115 The potential for abuse 
is great here. Due to the recent formalization of private market transfers 
under ARIN’s 2009 policy, which requires private market transfers to 
meet certain criteria, the magnitude of such activities is difficult to 
determine.
116
 
Of course, the preceding paragraphs are merely one of many ways to 
view the positions of the United States and Canadian governments. 
Viewed more skeptically, one begins to get a sense that the underlying 
motivations for governments in advocating centralized control of Internet 
architecture is to make digital surveillance easier and more cost 
effective.
117
 Individual privacy has been conspicuously absent from our 
discussion until now. However, when talking about IP addresses, 
individual privacy is a very real concern.
118
 Not all IP addresses implicate 
personal privacy concerns, though. Only a portion of IP addresses are 
linked to personally identifiable information, which minimizes the 
problem.
119
 Some scholars have suggested that IP addresses should be 
 
 
 113. Cf. Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. Under these 
views both unrestricted private market transfers and unduly restricted private market transfers can 
cause legacy address holders to forego registration with ARIN and other RIRs, suggesting a balance 
must be reached between the two extreme positions. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Brief in Support of Motion to Approve Sale of Internet Numbers, supra note 69, at 2. 
 116. See chart infra note 126. 
 117. Symposium, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) 
Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information. 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 895–
96 (2011). 
 118. See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Standards for Government Access to 
Communications and Associated Data, in 2 TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY DATA SECURITY 
LAW. 687, 702–03 (2009) (stating that privacy in IP addresses is a real concern because law 
enforcement routinely serve subpoenas to Internet Service Providers to unmask online speakers and 
ISPs will rarely fight these subpoenas). 
 119. See Symposium, supra note 117, at 900.  
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protected as personally identifiable information.
120
 This is to say that we 
should be rightly skeptical of any government arguments for centralized 
control of the Internet architecture, especially in the age of Edward 
Snowden and rampant NSA surveillance.
121
 Whether those privacy 
concerns are persuasive enough to upend the current model of Internet 
governance is unclear.  
C. Stakeholder Three: Private Market Actors in IPv4 Space 
“[IPv4] transactions need to be more efficient.” That statement 
encapsulates the view of Lindsey and Goodman.
122
 Those entities that 
wish to have greater freedom and control over their IP address resources 
certainly advocate for fewer restrictions on how they can transfer or sell 
their addresses.
123
 However, varying levels of sophistication and 
motivation have kept some companies from aggressively pursuing private 
market transfers, even in light of ARIN’s amended policy.124 Certain legal 
practitioners have already created robust practices centered on Internet 
number transactions.
125
 While only a few attorneys have jumped into the 
fray to participate in this exciting new type of transactional law, the 
number of transactions has been increasing rapidly.
126
 Without precise 
numbers, it is difficult to estimate the relative size of private-market 
transfers today; however, since ARIN almost exhausted its unallocated 
IPv4 numbers in the summer of 2015, it is likely that private-market 
 
 
 120. Id. at 899. 
 121. See generally ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the bulk of the 
NSA’s data collection program is unconstitutional). 
 122. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“There is 
actually a model for a market with more efficient transactions, RIPE. Around the time that IPv4 were 
exhausted, RIPE determined that accuracy of the registry was the most important goal and so they 
relaxed their transfer policies…APNIC and RIPE have systems designed to encourage transfer and 
registration with the RIRs.”). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. See Lindsey & Goodman, supra note 30. 
 126. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7 tbl.3.  
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transfers now account for close to one hundred percent of all new owners 
of IPv4 addresses.
127
  
This has potentially harmful implications. What now exists is 
essentially a temporal doughnut hole for access to free IP addresses.
128
 If 
the only available IP addresses must be purchased, a new barrier to entry 
on the Internet has thus been created. A new business that needs several 
hundred IP addresses before they can begin operations has two choices: 
1) spend considerable time and effort to migrate to IPv6 and hope that 
IPv6 addresses are available and are supported by your ISP, or 2) enter the 
private market for IPv4 addresses to purchase addresses according to the 
business’s needs.129 Neither option is an attractive one when considering 
that a few years prior, those addresses could have been procured free of 
charge from ARIN in exchange for signing the RSA.
130
 Somewhat 
counter-intuitively, in the rush to legitimize a private market for IPv4 
resources, access may have actually become more restricted.  
Consider the hypothetical situation where bankruptcy courts refused to 
approve the sale of IPv4 numbers in any case. In that instance, ARIN 
would be forced to attempt to reclaim unused IPv4 addresses from mostly 
non-legacy holders, as their rights are less robust than legacy holders, and 
attempt to redistribute them based on the “demonstrated need” of new 
applicants.
131
 At least in this hypothetical, everyone is equally restricted 
from obtaining new IPv4 resources at will, whereas in the current situation 
those with the most resources are in the best position to obtain new 
addresses and use them.
132
 Further, it is possible that disallowing private-
market transfers of IPv4 addresses would actually hasten the transition to 
IPv6.
 
 
Regarding whether property rights exist within legacy IPv4 addresses, 
the private market has resoundingly answered: it doesn’t matter.133 What 
has occurred is a broad recognition of a thing of value: unique Internet 
 
 
 
 127. IPv4 Address Report, supra note 7. 
 128. See van Beijnum, supra note 38; see also IPv6 Statistics, supra note 11. 
 129. See Rubi, supra note 8, at 485. 
 130. See Registration Services Agreement, supra note 20. 
 131. Draft Policy ARIN-2015-7: Simplified requirements for demonstrated need for IPv4 
transfers, AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NOS., http://lists.arin.net/pipermail/arin-ppml/2015-
June/030130.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (showing that ARIN in mid-2015 relaxed their 24 month 
“demonstrated need” showing in light of the increased volume of private transfers). 
 132. IPv4 scarcity together with the existence of the private market means that potential market 
entrants are forced to buy from private address holders rather than receive free addresses from ARIN.  
 133. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“Microsoft-
Nortel was a recognition that this had value, not the beginning of the idea, this was merely the 
formalization of the mechanism to buy/sell IPv4 addresses.”). 
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addresses. This recognition was followed by the creation of standardized 
practices for buying and selling IPv4 legacy addresses via asset purchase 
agreements.
134
 These developments point out the robust nature of private 
transactions and many firms’ frustration with dealing with ARIN  
There are limitations to this analysis, of course. Not all free market 
practitioners will have identical views on the development of IPv4 
markets.
135
 There are some practitioners who may look at it as a necessary 
evil that must be tolerated until IPv6 is fully supported. It is important to 
note that this is likely a temporary problem.
136
 The eventual transition to 
IPv6 architecture should mitigate some of inequalities that will develop 
through the operation of a private market, although a gap between 
developed countries and developing countries will likely persist.
137
 
IV. SCOPE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IPV4 LEGACY ADDRESSES 
John Locke’s labor theory of property states that an individual has “a 
property [right] in [her] own person” and in “[t]he labor of [her] body.”138 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned 
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It 
being removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by 
this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right 
of other Men.
139
 
In applying Locke’s view of labor theory to IPv4 addresses, there is a clear 
implication that natural law supports the recognition of some rights in the 
property.
140
 IPv4 address holders expend resources ensuring that their 
 
 
 134. Id. More importantly, the IPv4 legacy transaction norms and customs typically include 
registration with ARIN or an RIR that allows for retention of legacy status for subsequent purchasers. 
This supports the idea that barriers to registration emanate from RIRs, not the free market. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See IPv4 Address Report, supra note 7. Not to mention the fact that this will cause very 
immediate problems for developing countries and new businesses without the capital to buy existing 
IPv4 addresses. 
 137. See Rubi, supra note 8, at 487. 
 138. Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. 
REV. 739, 739–40 (1995) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16–30 
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952)). 
 139. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1967) (1698). 
 140. See id. 
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Internet numbers are not being used for nefarious purposes.
141
 However, 
ARIN too expends considerable resources maintaining the pool of IPv4 
addresses, providing free WHOIS services, as well as reverse address 
lookup to determine the identity of the actual users and licensees of IPv4 
addresses.
142
 Ultimately, natural law reflects an idea that those who 
expend effort and labor should have a recognized property right as a result 
of the value of that labor.
143
 In this instance, the efforts of ARIN to 
maintain its database are directly linked to the value of unique blocks of 
IPv4 addresses.
144
 Under Locke’s theory of property rights, the end user 
and registrant of IPv4 addresses should jointly hold some property rights 
in IPv4 addresses.
145
 
To address whether holders of IPv4 legacy addresses have protectable 
property rights, several comparisons need to be made, the first of which is 
between non-vanity and vanity telephone numbers.
146
 The FCC rules do 
not recognize property rights in a subscriber’s underlying phone 
number.
147
 Courts have used two approaches to determine the extent of 
subscriber rights in phone numbers:  
Under the first approach, courts use the law of contracts to 
determine a subscriber's rights . . . [u]nder the second approach, 
courts view vanity telephone numbers as a form of intellectual 
property that is protected from trademark infringement and unfair 
competition under both state common law and the federal Lanham 
Trademark Act.
148
  
This approach is instructive in terms of the factual comparison to IPv4 
legacy addresses, and also cognizant of the personally identifiable 
information critique.
149
 Courts have looked to the FCC regulations 
disclaiming any property rights in phone numbers as dispositive of the 
issue.
150
 There exist no such regulations in IPv4 addresses.
151
 It is 
 
 
 141. This will be even more accurate due to the capital and technical requirements of IPv6 
architecture. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. 
 142. See ARIN at a Glance, supra note 23. 
 143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Ryan et. al., supra note 2, at 344.  
 145. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 146. Vanity phone numbers are numbers such as 1-800-FLOWERS, whereas non-vanity numbers 
are residential telephone numbers. 
 147. In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC (Oct. 5, 1995), 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Notices/1995/fcc95419.html [hereinafter Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking]. 
 148. Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible Takings, 60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 676 (2007).  
 149. See Symposium, supra note 117. 
 150. See Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 676. 
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important to note though that in addition to not recognizing any property 
interests for subscribers’ phone numbers, the FCC prohibits the transfer of 
phone numbers between subscribers.
152
 Arguing by analogy, it would be 
difficult to see how one could argue for robust property rights in non-
legacy IPv4 addresses within the paradigm of phone numbers. 
This analysis, while helpful, is not directly applicable to our question. 
There are many differences between how IP addresses and telephone 
numbers are governed. Most notably, there is not an agency comparable to 
the FCC that places restrictions on ownership and transfer of IP addresses. 
Perhaps the most interesting comparison is whether vanity phone numbers 
are comparable to legacy IPv4 addresses. For vanity numbers, 
“[t]rademark law ignores the underlying number and instead protects the 
mnemonic spelled out in the vanity number.”153 This captures the 
fundamental similarity between legacy IPv4 addresses and vanity 
numbers. There is an underlying distinguishing feature about legacy 
addresses, since many contain personally identifiable information, and all 
are subject to less restrictive regulations by ARIN due to the lack of 
RSA.
154
 Trademark infringement cannot be invoked unless actual 
consumer confusion is shown.
155
 These expanded rights due to lack of a 
contract with ARIN do not implicate any consumer confusion. Some have 
noted that this produces incongruous law and fails to adequately protect 
the holders of entity locator rights (e.g., IP addresses, phone numbers, 
etc.).
156
  
In the late 1990s, the National Science Foundation (NSF), in concert 
with the Department of Commerce, issued a series of decisions, which 
divided the regulatory roles of Internet governance between non-profit 
entities and government agencies.
157
 In doing so, the NSF took care to 
separate domain names administration from IP address resource 
administration.
158
 NSF General Counsel Lawrence Rudolph, who has been 
 
 
 151. See Rubi, supra note 8 passim. 
 152. Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 677. 
 153. Id. at 679. 
 154. This final characteristic is what imbues legacy IPv4 addresses with their value. The activity 
of the private market has demonstrated that these addresses are more valuable than non-legacy 
addresses available from ARIN. Based on this, it can be said with certainty that legacy IPv4 addresses 
are sufficiently similar to vanity phone numbers to argue by analogy.  
 155. Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 680. 
 156. Id. at 681. 
 157. Brief History of the Domain Name System, HARVARD UNIV. (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/dnshistory.html (last visited Jan 
18, 2016). 
 158. See supra note 105. 
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in that position since 1995, reviewed the applicable law and gave the 
following statement on whether IPv4 addresses can be owned: 
NSF transferred a ‘thing of value’ to the awardee under the NSF-
NSI Cooperative Agreement, and that awardee in turn gave it to 
you. …we [NSF] know of no provision under the Cooperative 
Agreement which would have authorized the awardee (NSI) to 
unilaterally reclaim IPv4 number blocks, once distributed. The NSF 
has never had a cooperative agreement, or any other agreement, 
with ARIN or any other similarly situated entity. In short, NSF does 
not believe that ARIN, or for that matter any other organization, 
could retroactively affect property and rights distributed to you (or 
any other recipient) by awardee NSI under its Cooperative 
Agreement with the National Science Foundation.
159
 
This assertion by Rudolph is interesting on several fronts. The opinion is 
unique in that it is given by one of the earliest actors in Internet 
governance who was present during the creation of the modern Domain 
Name System.
160
 The origins of the statement and the qualifications of 
Rudolph together suggest that the “original intent” of the architects of the 
current Internet Governance regime was to allow IPv4 address ownership 
rights to be held by end users, not RIRs.
161
 If this view is persuasive to 
future policy makers and jurists, ARIN could face far greater challenges in 
connection with its policies towards legacy address holders.  
As explained above, there are at least three different ways to recognize 
property rights for end users of legacy IPv4 addresses. The first is Locke’s 
theory of natural property rights.
162
 The second is treating legacy IPv4 
addresses as analogous to vanity phone numbers.
163
 The final method is to 
look to the “original intent” of the architects of early Internet governance 
 
 
 159. MILTON MUELLER, It’s Official: Legacy IPv4 Address Block Holders Own Their 
NumberBlocks, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.internetgovernance. 
org/2012/09/22/its-official-legacy-ipv4-address-block-holders-own-their-number-blocks (quoting 
Rudolph’s statement). While the tongue-in-cheek title of this Mueller article suggests a definitive 
resolution of the question over legacy block ownership, it only refers to the statement by Rudolph. 
 160. Id. 
 161. This point should not be overstated. The information presented here merely indicates that at 
least some high-level NSF executives believed, contrary to ARIN’s assertions, that RIRs were not 
receiving exclusive property rights in IPv4 addresses during the reorganization of the late 1990s. It is 
important to keep in mind that this view has persisted in other forms, and Rudolph is cited to establish 
the longevity of this view. Id. 
 162. See LOCKE, supra note 139. 
 163. See supra notes 146–52. 
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such as Rudolph, who unequivocally supports the recognition of property 
rights in legacy IPv4 addresses.
164
 
From a 50,000-foot-view, it might seem like these Internet 
infrastructure companies such as ARIN and ICANN are operating anti-
competitively. After all, each entity has de facto control over all aspects of 
its resources by virtue of grants of authority from the US government.
165
 
ICANN, and to a lesser extent ARIN, has been the subject of several 
unsuccessful anti-trust suits over the years.
166
 Those who argue that ARIN 
operates anti-competitively miss the mark, however.
167
 It is important to 
keep in mind both that ARIN is a “bottom-up,” open, and transparent non-
profit organization that takes great care to make sure that its regulations 
are in line with the will of the Internet community it serves.
168
 Perhaps 
more crucially, the very nature of ARIN’s business suggests that the 
principles underlying our anti-trust laws are not applicable to the 
administration of Internet numbers.
169
 It is fairly clear that ARIN’s 
operation is not at loggerheads with the policy rationales that underlie U.S. 
anti-trust laws.
170
  
 
 
 164. See MUELLER, supra note 159. Mueller points out that at the very least, Rudolph disclaims 
that ARIN has any property rights in the legacy IPv4 addresses. Id. 
 165. See ICANN, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/icann; see infra note 167. 
 166. See Robert Lemos, VeriSign’s antitrust suit against ICANN dismissed, CNET (Aug. 27, 
2004), https://www.cnet.com/news/verisigns-antitrust-suit-against-icann-dismissed; US Circuit Court 
Upholds ICANN's Defense of the New gTLD Program, ICANN (July 31, 2015), https://www.icann. 
org/news/announcement-2-2015-07-31-en; Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice, Kremen v. ARIN, Ltd., No. C 06-02554 JW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2006), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/2615012/Kremen-v-American-Registry-For-Internet-Numbers-Ltd-
Document-No-41 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the antitrust action that had been filed 
against it). 
 167. ARIN easily defended the anti-trust suit brought by Mr. Kremen. See Ryan et. al., supra note 
2, at 364–65.  
 168. Ryan et al., supra note 2, at 355 (“Policy development is an open and transparent process. 
Anyone may participate in the process – a prior relationship as an ARIN member or customer is not a 
requirement, nor is it a requirement for a person to become a member.”) (quoting Internet Number 
Resource Policies, ARIN, http:// www.arin.net/policy/index.html). 
 169. Ryan et al. argue that oversight of transfer of IP resources has special benefits: 
There is an important policy side benefit to requiring that every transfer of IP resources 
proceed through the RIR, whose records are well maintained. For example, other government 
actors, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, will be able to use RIR records to 
ascertain if the person they believe is a terrorist, or other law enforcement agency believes is 
a child pornographer, has been issued a particular IP address by tracking the specific IP 
address from the RIR to the ISP, and obtaining the identification of the person with the 
unique IP address from the ISP, using appropriate legal demands.”  
Ryan et. al., supra note 2, at 366–67. 
 170. See A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2003) (concluding “that the U.S. government should either assume a more active role in setting 
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V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL AMBIGUITIES 
SURROUNDING OWNERSHIP OF IPV4 ADDRESSES 
While the courts could take any number of routes in deciding how 
property rights are to be delineated in IPv4 addresses, the apparent 
resolutions fall into three categories: (1) continue to treat legacy addresses 
like vanity phone numbers and non-legacy like ordinary phone numbers,
171
 
(2) unwind ARIN’s policy change to disallow private-market transfers and 
affirm ARIN’s exclusive control over the addresses, or (3) affirm the 
current state of IPv4 administration while examining the legal framework 
before the IPv6 transition. 
A. Vanity Phone Number Solution 
One potential parallel legal comparison suggested by Rubi is to treat 
IPv4 addresses like phone numbers.
172
 If this framework was broadened to 
cover non-bankruptcy IPv4 addresses, it would have a significant effect on 
the administration of IPv4 addresses. This would mean that IPv4 address 
holders, like vanity phone number holders, would have “a possessory 
interest…but no ownership interest” in those numbers.173  
This solution has several advantages. Some courts already 
acknowledge this paradigm, albeit on a limited basis.
174
 It is also a 
common-sense solution based on a fundamental recognition that if a 
business was not forced to sign an RSA, that business’s rights should be 
greater than those of a business that did sign an RSA. Further, it draws 
upon existing legal frameworks, which should cut down on future 
litigation.
175
 It is also a clear signal that while the courts respect ARIN’s 
central role in the IPv4 address space, the judiciary has the ultimate 
authority to determine property interests. This solution should not disrupt 
 
 
domain name policy or, in the alternative, let the market operate unfettered,” which suggests that 
ARIN, in absence of more active supervision, should be left to its own administration). 
 171. This characterization of the status quo in the private market for IPv4 transfers is a little over-
simplified. In the current market, non-legacy address holders must comply with ARIN’s RSA if they 
wish to transfer, buy, or sell addresses. Legacy holders do not have to follow the RSA unless the buyer 
and seller agree that they will update ARIN’s registry information upon execution of the sale. There 
are advantages and disadvantages to registration, the most meaningful of which is loss of legacy status. 
If ARIN is notified of a transfer, it mandates the new address user sign an RSA. Ryan et al., supra note 
2, at 357, 371–72. 
 172. Rubi, supra note 8, at 499–501. 
 173. Id at 501. 
 174. See, e.g., supra note 65. Nortel recognized this view in a bankruptcy sale of assets where 
ARIN secured an LRSA with the eventual buyer. 
 175. See Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 678. 
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the private market for IPv4 transfers. Additionally, this solution would not 
necessarily be inconsistent with ARIN’s position as gatekeeper to IPv4 
addresses. While ARIN’s role may change with respect to legacy address 
holders who would have expanded property rights in IPv4 addresses, 
ARIN would still serve as gatekeeper and registrar of IPv4 assets.
176
 
Treating IPv4 addresses like vanity phone numbers would represent a 
small modification to the current IPv4 address transfer regime in North 
America, the change being that even if a legacy address is bought and sold 
via the private market, and ARIN is notified of the transaction, the address 
would retain its legacy status.
177
 This would be a distinct change from 
ARIN’s current policy, which forces the purchasers of legacy addresses 
who wish to register them with ARIN to agree to their LRSA or RSA.
178
 
One of the earliest advisors for private-market IPv4 transfers, Marc 
Lindsey, believes that “the biggest problem is that ARIN wishes to tightly 
constrain transactions.”179 These constraints lead to higher transactional 
costs for private IPv4 transactions.
180
  
Allowing legacy addresses to retain property rights through subsequent 
private market transfers would bring ARIN’s transfer policies in line with 
Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) and Asia Pacific Network Information’s 
(APNIC) transfer policies, which allow for the retention of legacy status 
for subsequent purchasers.
181
 The primary benefit of RIPE and APNIC’s 
policy is increased accuracy of RIR registration records, because new 
purchasers of IPv4 legacy addresses have little incentive to forego 
registration.
182
 Accuracy of RIR records is paramount with increasing 
digital privacy and security concerns.
183
 Inaccurate recordkeeping of IPv4 
ownership makes cybercrime investigations more difficult, hinders 
commercial activity through costly investigations in order to validate the 
chain of title for IPv4 assets, and runs contrary to the stated missions of 
RIRs to create robust registries for Internet numbers.
184
 The end result of 
 
 
 176. In this hypothetical, ARIN could still be the clearinghouse for legacy IPv4 addresses and 
have an ownership interest in those numbers. 
 177. Businesses and individuals are likely to do this. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey 
& Janine Goodman, supra note 30. 
 178. Rubi, supra note 8, at 493.  
 179. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 84, at 5 (Mueller persuasively argues that accuracy is 
crucial for keeping the IP address space efficient and secure). 
 184. The biggest concern for most companies that buy and sell IPv4 addresses is validating the 
chain of title to ensure the addresses are not being used for criminal purposes. See Telephone Interview 
with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. 
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these uneven restrictions across RIRs could be a “net flow of IP addresses 
out of ARIN,” which would deplete the North American supply of IP 
addresses.
185
 Viewed from the private market perspective, ARIN’s 
restrictions on IPv4 addresses create additional transactional friction that 
increases the cost of doing business with ARIN and leads to inaccurate 
registries. 
B. Pre-2009 ARIN Solution 
A second possible solution is essentially a denial of all possessory and 
ownership rights in IPv4 addresses. Under this solution, ARIN’s RSAs 
would still be valid and enforceable. The only difference would be that 
ARIN would cease facilitating private market transfers of IP addresses. 
While it is a radical step that would certainly cause a flood of litigation, it 
may be the most logical solution if the main goal is maintaining an open, 
honest, and transparent Internet.
186
 The courts could determine that ARIN 
is acting within a grant of authority from the U.S. government and that 
long-held tenants of contract law govern what private parties may do with 
these addresses. This would strengthen ARIN’s ability to reclaim IPv4 
addresses that were not in use and redistribute them to the broader 
community based upon demonstrated need.
187
  
Denying all individual property rights in IP addresses would aid ARIN 
in managing and tracking current IPv4 allocations, in addition to better 
facilitating the transition to IPv6. There is precedent for such a move.
188
 
The Department of Defense was an early collaborator that spent 
considerable resources developing the first Internet capable machines.
189
 
As such, they have large blocks of IPv4 addresses at their disposal. 
“Importantly, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has also 
agreed to create a process for the return and repatriation of IPv4 resources 
it no longer needs, and for their return to ARIN for redistribution of these 
 
 
 185. Id. (based on the careful observation of Mr. Lindsey over the past eight years of advising 
clients on IP address matters).  
 186. Once again, this is a question of values and priorities. For those scholars primarily concerned 
about the barriers to entry to doing business on the Internet, this is the optimal solution. See supra Part 
III.C. 
 187. This is not a large benefit to the plan because most non-legacy addresses are in use due to the 
“demonstrated need” requirement imposed by ARIN on all IPv4 allocations and transactions. A more 
impactful action would be to free up some of the out-of-use legacy addresses, of which there are many. 
However, the mechanism to do that would be far more radical than what this Note suggests. See K. 
HUBBARD ET. AL., INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, RFC 2050: INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION 
GUIDELINES 7–8 (Nov. 1996), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2050.  
 188. Ryan et al., supra note 2, at 369. 
 189. Id. at 370–71. 
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resources to the community as the DOD decides it no longer needs these 
resources.”190 Based on this example, a voluntary return program could be 
implemented to free up unused blocks for repurposed use. The issue 
remains, however, that companies would still need to be convinced of the 
value of voluntarily returning unused addresses.
191
 That worry is alleviated 
by a strong judicial signal disclaiming property rights in non-legacy IPv4 
addresses. IPv4 scarcity will affect everyone in North America equally 
under this plan because companies would need demonstrate need for the 
addresses rather than buying blocks from private address holders. Thus, 
the large ISPs who are necessarily the key players in the United States’ 
ongoing transition to IPv6 addresses would not be able to buy time via 
private purchases of IPv4 addresses.
192
  
C. Affirm the Status Quo Solution 
The final, and most likely, solution is for the courts to give judicial 
approval to ARIN’s current administration of IPv4 addresses. This 
solution is valuable because it is the least disruptive to ARIN and to the 
private market as it would involve essentially a judicial rubber stamp.
193
 
This solution recognizes the immediate necessity of the private market for 
IPv4 addresses, at least in bankruptcy proceedings, while keeping an eye 
towards the vital role that ARIN plays in keeping the Internet secure, 
open, and free. Like the Pre-2009 Solution,
194
 this solution recognizes 
ARIN’s legitimacy as the de facto administrative body of all IP address 
resources.
195
 
This solution would not prevent the free market from appropriately 
addressing the very real scarcity that currently infests the IPv4 allocation 
pool. It allows private companies to buy and sell legacy IPv4 addresses, 
and allows each buyer to choose whether to register the addresses with 
ARIN and make the required showing that it has a demonstrated need for 
 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (noting that 
the early existence of a private market for IPv4 addresses suggests that companies will hoard addresses 
rather than return them). This is a significant concern. 
 192. Due to the increased scarcity of IPv4 addresses under this solution, it follows that investment 
in and adoption of IPv6 architecture would accelerate. 
 193. The private market, while difficult to measure, appears to have reached a state of equilibrium 
according to Lindsey and Goodman. Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, 
supra note 30. 
 194. See infra Part V.B. 
 195. An additional benefit of this solution is that it ignores the antitrust issue regarding ARIN’s 
role in the market. 
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the IPv4 address resources over the next twenty four months.
196
 It also 
shores up ARIN’s position on non-legacy addresses by treating the RSAs 
as granting a mere “right of use.”197 In this solution ARIN is still treated as 
indispensable to the ongoing administration of the Internet, which has the 
dual advantage of preserving an important source of institutional 
knowledge while maintaining continuity in the overall structure of Internet 
governance.  
CALL FOR FURTHER CLARITY 
It is relatively clear from recent events and scholarship that legacy IPv4 
addresses do contain at least some limited property rights.
198
 Non-legacy 
addresses, however, may be far more restricted. In either case, there is a 
clear need for judicial review of property rights in IPv4 addresses. The 
issue, of course, is the pathway that potential litigation might take to reach 
the appellate courts. Legacy addresses have some judicial clarity, while the 
same cannot be said for non-legacy addresses. Unfortunately, until more 
non-legacy IPv4 address holders attempt to break ARIN’s RSA, there is 
not likely to be much litigation on the issue.
199
 Timing is a double-edged 
sword due to the eventual transition to IPv6 addresses will render the issue 
effectively moot.
200
 However, the Nortel Networks
201
 case did demonstrate 
on a limited basis that businesses value unencumbered IPv4 resources 
more than they value more legally secure addresses governed by ARIN’s 
RSA.
202
  
The value placed on legacy IPv4 over the value placed on non-legacy 
IPv4 addresses by the private market is crucial to figuring out how this 
issue is going to be resolved. As long as the private market will pay for 
unencumbered legacy addresses, then there will be pressure on ARIN to 
 
 
 196. Marc Lindsey noted that current legacy address holders can choose whether they are going to 
notify RIRs of ownership changes. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, 
supra note 30. 
 197. See Strickling, supra note 105. 
 198. See MUELLER, supra note 17; MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16; Telephone Interview with 
Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30; Rubi, supra note 8. See also LOCKE, supra note 139, 
at 306. 
 199. This is the paradox of the private market for IP addresses: the only entities with the resources 
and financial stake in challenging ARIN’s status as IP regulator have little incentive to file suit for fear 
of a costly outcome. 
 200. See DEERING & HINDEN, supra note 10. 
 201. See In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09BK10138, 2011 WL 1560720, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Mar. 21, 2011). 
 202. Id. It bears repeating that the judge in Nortel approved the transfer of IPv4 addresses only 
after ARIN filed a brief with the court stating that it had approved the transfer. 
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ease the friction of those transactions. Further, it is difficult to predict what 
will happen due to the presence of disparate policies among the global 
community of RIRs.
203
 The fact that Asia and Europe’s respective RIRs 
allow legacy holders to transfer control of legacy addresses to new entities 
that can register them with APNIC and RIPE without losing the legacy 
status of the addresses will have serious implications for the ability of 
ARIN and other RIRs to protect their supplies of IPv4 addresses. 
Interestingly, APNIC and RIPE may have provided the exact blueprint 
for how to solve the legacy-address riddle. Both scholarly sources and 
free-market practitioners agree that accurate IP registries are paramount 
for secure and continued growth of the Internet as a means of commerce 
and as a means of communication.
204
 If ARIN were to change its policies 
to allow for subsequent purchasers of legacy addresses to register those 
numbers without signing an RSA, then the free market will be able to 
better provision the world with affordable IPv4 resources until such time 
that the IPv6 transition is accomplished.
205
 However, if nothing changes, 
ARIN’s policy deficit vis-à-vis APNIC and RIPE will continue to lead to 
“venue shopping” for companies looking to control IPv4 resources.206  
However, it is difficult to make a recommendation as to which 
paradigm of Internet governance will be most useful in the future. Like 
most issues, the answer depends on what values are most important to 
preserve. If freedom to contract is paramount, then recognizing ARIN’s 
centrality to IPv4 address administration is proper and likely the least 
disruptive. If equality of access to Internet resources is the chief goal, then 
ARIN should be granted expanded rights to reclaim and distribute IPv4 
addresses based upon demonstrated need no matter the potential societal 
disruption. 
To further complicate matters, the U.S. Commerce Department’s 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
transferred IANA authority to a “broad base of Internet stakeholders”.207 
 
 
 203. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 16. 
 204. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30. See 
generally Rubi supra note 8; Ryan et. al., supra note 2. 
 205. Nortel suggests that ARIN already allows for subsequent legacy transfers in a bankruptcy 
context. 
 206. See Telephone Interview with Marc Lindsey & Janine Goodman, supra note 30 (“There is a 
notion of some RIR shopping.”). 
 207. Ellen Powell, Has the United States ‘lost control’ of the Internet?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2016/0928/Has-the-United-States-lost-
control-of-the-internet. 
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In order to accomplish this, NTIA is ending its contract with ICANN.
208
 
While this will change absolutely nothing in terms of the day to day 
functioning of the Internet, it has caused a stir among some critics.
209
 It 
bears mentioning at least that the next few years will be crucial from the 
perspective of setting Internet governance norms. 
If equality of access and fostering a pro-growth Internet governance 
scheme are paramount, then the last thing U.S. observers wish to see 
would be a compromise between ARIN and the free-market IPv4 traders. 
The Internet is unique in that it brings together people from opposite sides 
of the ideological spectrum into one expansive idea space. ARIN itself is 
an embodiment of the principles that have made the Internet such a 
disruptive and wonderful technology.
210
 Before ARIN or other 
stakeholders in the IPv4 market take any action, it is first necessary to 
clarify the goals inherent in the structure of the Internet and discuss the 
best way to bring about those goals.  
All these values have a place and role in determining the proper 
allocation of authority in the Internet governance regime. For legacy 
address holders who have never signed a contract limiting their rights in 
their IPv4 addresses, they should have complete ownership rights in those 
addresses to buy, sell, trade, or give away as they see fit without being 
subject to a new RSA by ARIN. However, they cannot expect continued 
free WHOIS and tracking services from ARIN. ARIN would be well 
within its rights to charge these types of legacy address holders if they 
request services from ARIN. This is crucial here because it is 
fundamentally unfair to bind parties to terms they never agreed to or 
anticipated.
211
 
For legacy address holders who signed LRSAs or RSAs at some point 
since being allocated addresses, those agreements must govern. These 
entities, presumably, knew full well what they were signing and had 
adequate notice of the rights they were foregoing in signing. They will still 
be able to participate in the private market under ARIN’s 2009 Amended 
 
 
 208. David G. Post & Danielle Kehl, Controlling Internet Infrastructure Part I: The “IANA 
Transition” and Why It Matters for the Future of the Internet 1 (July 27, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2636417. 
 209. See Powell, supra note 207. 
 210. The Request for Comment (RFC) system was designed by ARIN to facilitate discussion and 
debate among its members to build consensus, increase transparency, and foster accountability. 
 211. At this point, the discussion of antitrust is pertinent to but separate from the main conclusion. 
Under this structure, ARIN would most certainly be subject to antitrust litigation if it began to charge 
for its WHOIS lookup service because it is the only market player capable of offering such a service 
and any change to it would be looked at as potentially anti-competitive. 
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RSA Policy
212
, but they will have more restricted rights and any potential 
transferee would have to demonstrate need per ARIN policy. 
For non-legacy address holders, the situation is straightforward. These 
entities do not have property rights in their addresses beyond those usage 
rights granted by ARIN’s RSA.213 They are bound by ARIN’s policies and 
are subject to the remedies contemplated in the RSA.
214
 Without a ruling 
that ARIN exerts anti-competitive pressure on the market for IP 
addresses,
215
 it is unlikely that non-legacy address holders will see any 
expanded recognition of property rights in their addresses.
216
  
Despite the many solutions surveyed in this Note, the best solution is 
likely the simplest one: do nothing. Since its founding, ARIN has 
demonstrated itself to be a benevolent steward acting in furtherance of the 
pursuit of an open, free, and equally-accessible Internet. The impending 
transition to IPv6 architecture will mean that an ever-decreasing amount of 
global Internet traffic will depend on IPv4 architecture. Despite the 
arguments in favor of recognition of formal property rights in IPv4 legacy 
addresses, the benefits of a robust and accurate registry are more 
compelling. Until the U.S. courts or Congress address these legal issues, 
the free market will continue to do what it does best: place value on 
obscure goods, allocate resources efficiently, and continue to provision 
individuals and companies with the only available sources of IPv4 
addresses. 
Benjamin Shantz

 
 
 
 212. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 84, at 3. 
 213. See Registration Services Agreement, supra note 20.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Such a ruling is exceedingly unlikely. See Ryan et. al., supra note 2. 
 216. This situation could change if the scarcity of IPv4 addresses becomes so great that the price 
of IPv4 addresses rises to the point that non-legacy holders begin contemplating breaking their RSAs 
with ARIN.  
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